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Section IV describes some of the specific criticisms of the expansion of the rape definition in California, Illinois, and other jurisdictions. General criticisms of the policy fall into three categories: (1) it creates an unworkable rule because it is impossible to define a reasonable amount of time for the partner to stop after the women withdraws her consent; (2) it victimizes men; and (3) it trivializes the harm done to those women who are victims of "actual" rapes.34 Some advocates raise an additional concern 28 See discussion infra Part IV. 
DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 17 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIES OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736)
). This reasoning as to generalized consentthat a woman cannot retract her consent to sexual intercourse once she enters into marriage-is the same used to argue that, if a woman initially consents to an individual sexual act, she then is proscribed from withdrawing that consent during the act. 204 App. Brief, supra note 3, at 9 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ? 263 (2003)). "Our conclusion that no rape occurs under these circumstances does not preclude the perpetrator from being found guilty of another crime or crimes warranted by the evidence." Vela, 218
Cal. Rptr. at 165.
205 John Z., 60 P.3d at 186.
206 Id ("Contrary to Vela's assumption, we have no way of accurately measuring the level of outrage the victim suffers from being subjected to continued forcible intercourse following withdrawal of her consent. We must assume the sense of outrage is substantial.").
Observers have noted that the rule advocated by both John and the Vela court "equates the harm of rape with penetration alone and ignores the loss of sexual freedom that occurs when a woman is forced to continue a sexual encounter against her will." Martha Chamallas, The court rejected John's "primal urge" theory, citing a complete lack of any supporting authority.215 Further, the court found the argument contrary to the state's rape statute, which contains no language that "suggests that the defendant is entitled to persist in intercourse once his victim withdraws her consent."216 Even so, the record suggests that John (criticizing the lack of specificity in Roundtree's rule that "rape therefore is necessarily committed when a victim withdraws her consent during sexual intercourse but is forced to complete the act"). 217 Id The court noted that Laura repeated her admonition that she "had to go home" three times, with John ignoring her pleas each time. Id. The court determined that John "continued the sex act for at least four or five minutes after Laurafirst told him she had to go home," and that after her third plea John continued to force sex on her "for about a 'minute, 223 App. Brief, supra note 3, at 13-14. John conceded in his brief that Laura "expressly withdrew her consent after..,. eight and a half to nine minutes." Id. However, he also noted that "the evidence demonstrates that Laura is an outgoing, conversational, independent and sexually experienced person. There is no evidence that she is shy, easily dominated or unable to perceive a situation at face value." Id. at 12.
224 John Z., 60 P.3d at 189 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
225 Id at 188 (Brown, C.J., dissenting). 
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The Kansas Court of Appeals was unmoved, and found that such a definition would lead to a "tortuous interpretation" of the Kansas rape statute.237 Further, it rejected the defendant's "reasonable time" argument, and adopted the rule that "when consent is withdrawn, continuing sexual intercourse for five to ten minutes is not reasonable and constitutes rape."238
The However, the need for change exists, and legislatures, as well as the judiciary, should both position themselves to enact these reforms while attention is focused on them.254
A. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE REFORM
Critics of the post-penetration rape laws have three major complaints:
(1) the reform creates an unworkable rule because it is impossible to define a "reasonable" time for the partner to stop after the women withdraws her consent; (2) the reform victimizes men; and (3) the reform trivializes the harm done to those women who are victims of "actual" rapes.
The Reform is Ambiguous and Unworkable
The first group of critics argues that the reform creates a vague mandate that is impossible for men, and even women, to follow.255 This difficulty is twofold: it is hard for the man to know both if the woman has withdrawn her consent and when to stop if he feels the consent has been withdrawn.256 Once a woman agrees to sexual intercourse and the act begins, it may become difficult for a man to determine if she withdraws her consent.257 In addition, since no court has adopted an explicit "reasonable" The question as to whether courts or legislatures should implement a "reasonable" time after which a male must withdraw is slightly more complicated. Certainly, both courts and state legislatures could adopt specific guidelines as to the time a male has to cease intercourse after the female's manifestation of nonconsent.262 It would not be the first time a legislature or judicial body has set a specific time to an action to prevent violation of a constitutional right.263 However, critics are persuasive when they decry attempts by either courts or legislatures to codify a particular mean that girls will believe in a "fairytale world without consequences" that is "not realistic"). This approach has also been adopted by the California Coalition Against Sexual Assault. Since current public attention to the issue might spark a series of legislative reforms, similar to those that removed or revised the marital rape exemption in nearly all states, the price of inaction could potentially be very high.288
Presently, the reform has taken hold in only eight jurisdictions out of fifty- a jury to understand, and give them permission to say that when she says no, it means no, regardless of whether there was sexual activity before." Acquaintance Rape, supra note 258
